جھوٹی گواہی سے متعلق تحریری فیصلہ جاری، جھوٹے گواہ کیخلاف کارروائی کا حکم

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019
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witnesses appearing in trials of criminal cases to indulge infalsehood and lies making it more and more difficult for the courtsto discover truth and dispense justice. We have undertaken anexhaustive exercise so as to trace the history of the said rule andto understand how the jurisprudence around it has developed inPakistan while also adverting to the relevant Islamic and legalprovisions dealing with the subject. After a careful consideration ofthe history of the rule, the relevant Islamic provisions and the lawof the land and after analysing the precedent case-law available onthe subject we have come to the conclusion that the view that therule is not to be applied to criminal cases in Pakistan was formedas a result of taking into account extraneous and practicalconsiderations, rather than legal and jurisprudential, and the saidview is not in accord with the Islamic provisions on the subjectbesides militating against the criminal law of this countryaccording to which deposing falsely in a court and commission ofperjury entail serious penal consequences. While coming to thesaid conclusion we first looked at the rule in its historicalperspective, then traced through case-law as to how the rule wassaid to be not applicable in Pakistan and how it has been dealtwith by this Court and lastly analysed the Islamic provisionsrelevant to the matter of giving false testimony. The followingparagraphs deal with each of these heads turn by turn.
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
 – Historical perspective
4.
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus 
 is a Latin phrase meaning“false in one thing, false in everything.” The rule held that awitness who lied about any material fact must be disbelieved as toall facts
1
 because of the reason that the “presumption that thewitness will declare the truth ceases as soon as it manifestlyappears that he is capable of perjury” and that “Faith in awitness’s testimony cannot be partial or fractional….”
2
 In its
1
 
George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 654 (1997)
 
2
 
 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise On The Law Of Evidence, 233 (Boston,Wells & Lilly) (1826)
 
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original form, the rule was mandatory and the notion “was that thetestimony of one detected in a lie was wholly worthless and
must 
 ofnecessity be rejected.”
3
 John Henry Wigmore, an American juristwho served as the Dean of Northwestern Law School from 1901 to1929, traced the rule to the Stuart treason trials of the late 17
th
 century 
4
. In
Trial of Hampden 
 (9 Howell’s State Trials 1053, 1101(1684)), it was contended while referring to the rule of
 falsus inuno, falsus in omnibus 
 that “
If we can prove that what he hath saidof my lord of Essex is false, he is not to be believed against thedefendant 
.” In
Trial of Langhom 
 (7 Howell’s State Trials 417, 478(1679)), it was argued that “
If I can prove any one point (in answerto that which he hath given evidence) not to be true, then I conceive,my lord, he ought to be set aside 
.” Similarly, it finds mention in
Trial of Coleman 
 (7 Howell’s State Trials I, 71 (1678)) that “
[I]twould much enervate any man’s testimony, to the whole, if he couldbe proved false in any one thing 
.” Barbara Shapiro, an Americanacademic and author, notes that Michael Dalton’s early 17
th
 century manual for Justices of the Peace advised magistrates thatwhen examining accused felons, they should discredit the whole ofthe accused’s story if any part proved false.
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 5. By the early nineteenth century English judges were telling juries that they
might
– but
need 
 not – disbelieve the entiretestimony of a witness who had lied about a material fact.
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 In theUnited States of America, however, the U.S. Supreme Courtendorsed a mandatory form of the rule as late as 1822, as didsome state courts well into the twentieth century. In the case of
The Santissima Trinidad 
 (20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 339 (1822)) it washeld that when a witness tells a deliberate falsehood, the courts of justice are bound to apply the maxim
 falsus in uno 
,
 falsus inomnibus 
. In the famous O. J. Simpson murder trial the Judge in
3
 
 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System Of EvidenceIn Trials At Common Law (1940)
 
4
 
 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System Of EvidenceIn Trials At Common Law (1940)
 
5
 
Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause: HistoricalPerspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (1991)
 
6
 
George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 655 (1997)
 
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 200 of 2019
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that case instructed the jurors that “[a] witness who is willfullyfalse in one material part of his or her testimony is to be distrustedin others.”
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False testimonies in the courts in India
 – An old menace
6. In an article
Truthful Character of Indian Witnesses
(AIR1945 Journal 6) Thakur Prasad Dubey, M.A., LL.B., P.C.S.(Judicial), Farrukhabad had written about the unfortunate trend offalse testimonies in courts in the undivided India. He had observedas follows:
 “It is a well-known fact that Judges even of the Highest Tribunalsof the land have very often expressed their opinions thatwitnesses in India are greater liars than elsewhere and such anopinion yet continues to be entertained throughout the countryby very many Judges. The Judicial Committee made the followingobservations in a very old case reported in 4 M.I.A. 431 [(1849) 4M.I.A. 431 (P.C.), Mudhoo Soodun Sundial v. Suroop ChunderSirkar.] at p.441:“It is quite true that such is the lamentabledisregard of truth prevailing among the nativeinhabitants of Hindustan that all oral evidence isnecessarily received with great suspicion.” Their Lordships again affirmed their conviction in another casereported in 11 M.I.A. 177 [(’67) 11 M.I.A. 177 (P.C.), Wise v.Sunduloonissa Chowdhrance.] where it was said:“In a native case it is not uncommon to find a truecase placed on a false foundation and supported inpart by false evidence.”C. D. Field, an old eminent commentator of Law of Evidence, hasthe following to say on the point:“There would appear to be an opinion prettygenerally prevalent that witnesses in India aremore mendacious than witnesses in othercountries and it has repeatedly been stated that Judges in India have a far more difficult task toperform than Judges in England in consequence ofthe untruthful nature of evidence with which theyhave to deal. (Introduction pp. 30-31, Edn. 8).”A somewhat familiar observation was made by a Bench of theAllahabad High Court in a recent murder case of Azamgarh aboutwhich there was some controversy in the press. Taylor hasattempted to give reasons for such a general prevalence offalsehood. He says:“Thus it has been justly observed that a propensityto lying has always been more or less a peculiar
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California Jury Instructions, Criminal, Section 2.21.2 (West 1993)
 
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